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Political parties vary not only in their electoral strength and stability of their 
support bases, but also in how territorially uneven these bases are. Indeed, more 
or less significant regional effects in party support have been detected in most 
countries of the world.' The major purpose of this study is to construct a new 
numerical indicator of what may be called ‘party system regionalization’. In the 
first section of the analysis, we will discuss the existing measures. It will be 
demonstrated that these measures are not fully appropriate for the purposes of 
cross-national research, which justifies our attempt to develop an alternative 
indicator. To test the implications of the proposed measure, we will use it to 
examine the dynamics of party system regionalization in eight countries that 
have experienced or are experiencing transitions to democracy -  Austria, 
Bolivia, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Venezuela. In the course 
of this inquiry, we will systematically relate the observed levels of party system 
regionalization to the dynamics of another party system property, fragmentation. 
Thus in the subsequent sections of the analysis, the use of the proposed indicator 
will allow us to address a well-recognized theoretical issue in the comparative 
study of party systems. The issue is whether the rise of ‘national’, not ‘regional’, 
political parties can be associated with party system consolidation. Richard Rose 
and Derek Urwin plausibly hypothesized that party system development 
involves trends towards less regional differentiation in party support." At the 
same time, excessive fragmentation is often viewed as an important property of 
unconsolidated party systems.3 Hence it can be expected, first, that party system 
regionalization is associated with party system concentration, and second, that 
party systems become less regionalized as they consolidate. These theoretical 
expectations may or may not be correct if applied to the well-established 
democracies. Apparently, recent developments in several western countries 
brought about increased levels of regionalism and fragmentation in party 
politics. For the study of new democracies, however, the intuitive appeals of 
these hypotheses remain largely intact, which justifies testing them by analyzing 
empirical evidence generated by the application of the new measure. In our 
conclusion, the results of statistical analysis will be reported alongside with 
several findings derived from the qualitative case studies.
The Problems of Measurement
Measurement is essential for expressing differences among party system formats 
in a compact numerical form. Not surprisingly, there were several attempts to 
develop an index expressing territorial dispersion in party support. The earliest 
of these attempts can be found in the pioneering work of Rose and Urwin. They 
employ several different measures of dispersion in party vote.4 One of them is 
simply the standard deviation of the vote for the given party in each region from 



























































































‘regional mean’, as it will be further referred to. The second measure, labeled 
‘the Index of Variation’, is the mean deviation. It can be obtained by subtracting 
a party’s percentage vote in each region from its regional mean, summing the 
absolute differences, and dividing by the number of regions. Both indices are 
calculated in percentages. The third index, that of ‘Cumulative Regional 
Inequality’, is obtained by subtracting the absolute share of a party's national 
vote that it obtains in each region from the absolute share of the voting 
population found in that region, summing the absolute differences, and dividing 
by two.
Each of the proposed measures, however, is biased. Because the standard 
deviation and the Index of Variation are computed from deviations from the 
party’s mean vote, small parties with low overall levels of support are likely to 
record only small deviations in most regions. 1 Therefore, the indices attribute 
low levels of regionalization to purely regional but very small parties. Yet 
another disadvantage is that they attribute higher values to those parties which 
operate in countries consisting of small numbers of regions. In fact, it is not 
altogether clear why Rose and Urwin chose to employ two measures so closely 
related to each other; the high level of correlation between their values suggests 
that either of them would suffice. Both measures are non-standardized and they 
do not have upper limits. The Cumulative Index of Inequality, which runs from 
zero to one, lacks such a shortcoming. This measure, however, gives too much 
weight to differences in the sizes of the regions. Consider a hypothetical party 
operating in a country that consists of three regions. One of them comprises 70 
per cent of the population, another 20 per cent, and the third -  10 per cent. If the 
party receives corresponding shares of the vote in each of the regions, the 
Cumulative Index of Inequality describes it as a purely national party. 
Intuitively, however, we would rather describe it as a party with a strong support 
base in the largest region.
The ‘variability coefficient’ employed by Svante Ersson, Kenneth Janda, 
and Jan-Erik Lane can be obtained by dividing the standard deviation by the 
regional mean.6 The obvious purpose of this operation is to produce an index 
adjusted for the variation in individual party sizes, and it cannot be denied that 
the values of the index published by the authors are much more plausible than 
those yielded by unadjusted standard deviation. However, the index yields larger 
values for those parties that operate in countries consisting of large numbers of 
regions. Additionally, as a measure of territorial concentration in party support, 
the proposed measure has a shortcoming of being a non-bounded index. As a 
result, its values are widely dispersed. In the selection of cases provided by the 
authors, they run from 0.104 to 3.484 without any theoretically set upper limit 




























































































measure, but it is scarcely possible to develop a system-level measure on this 
basis.
Table 1 gives the values of the three indices discussed above for four 
hypothetical parties. All of them receive all of their support in one region only. 
For any practical reason, they are purely -  and equally -  regional parties. Parties 
A and B operate in countries consisting of five regions each, C and D -  in 
countries consisting of ten regions each. Parties A and C receive 50 per cent of 
the vote in the regions of their prominence, while B and D -  just 10 per cent. 
None of the indices produces intuitively correct -  that is, maximal and equal -  
values. Relative sizes of the regions are not taken into account, which makes it 
impossible to illustrate the Index of Cumulative Regional Inequality. But from 
the example given above, it can be inferred that this index also has undesirable 
properties. It can be concluded that none of the existing measures can be safely 
used in cross-national research on party systems.
Table 1. The values of different indices of regionalization for four 
hypothetical cases
Standard deviation Index of variation Variability
coefficient
A 22.4 16.0 2.2
B 4.5 3.2 2.2
C 15.8 9.0 3.2
D 3.2 178 3.2
The indices observed above share an important property -  they all employ the 
concept of deviation, defined in this or that way, as their core expressions. 
Indeed, there is no other way to measure distinctiveness of any kind but to 
examine to what extent the observed set of values deviates from our norm or 
expectation. In case of regionalization, the ‘norm’ is obviously the regional 
mean of the vote cast for the given party. As we have seen, the major problem 
with measuring this property is that to serve its purpose, any proposed index has 
to be adjusted both to the size of individual parties and to the number of regions. 
Then it cannot avoid a “multi-storey” form. But exactly for this reason, the core 
expression must be very simple, a condition better satisfied by the sum of 
absolute deviations from the regional mean, rather than by standard deviation. 
Thus, for any individual party, the core of the regionalization coefficient can be 
obtained by subtracting the party’s absolute share of the vote in each region (r,) 
from its regional mean (r„), summing the absolute differences, and dividing by 





























































































Turning back to our hypothetical parties, this operation yields the values 
of 0,4, 0,08, 0,45, and 0,09 for parties A, B, C. and D, respectively. Dividing the 
core expression by the sum of the shares of the vote in individual regions (£/,) 
provides control for party size, thus yielding much more realistic results -  0.8. 
0,8, 0,9, and 0,9. But this time, parties operating in countries with many regions 
appear to be more regionalized. In order to adjust the index for the number of 
regions (n), it is sufficient to multiply it by ;i/(/i -  1). In our hypothetical 
example, this yields the intuitively correct values of 1,0 in all four cases. Finally, 
we find it useful to standardize the coefficient by taking its square root. The 
rationale for this (unnecessary) operation is that it reduces the numerical 
dispersion of the values without altering their substantial contents. The resulting 
formula, R ’ = Vn£|r„ -  r,j/(2(n -  l)S>,j,8 yields zero if the party
receives exactly the same share of the vote in each region. It yields one if the 
party receives all its support in only one region, irrespectively of how strong this 
support is, and how many regions there are. It is not defined if there is only one 
region or if the party receives no votes at all.
R' is the index of individual party regionalization. It is not directly 
convertible into a system-level measure. Obviously, a party system where all 
existing regional parties are very small cannot be viewed as a ‘regionalized’ one. 
Adjusting each of the individual parties’ regionalization coefficients (/?,’) for 
their shares of the national vote (pt) can solve this problem. The synthetic 
formula can be calculated quite simply on an additive basis: Reg = I.(R,'p,) .9 
Reg equals zero if all parties are evenly supported throughout the nation, and it 
equals one if each of the individual parties receives all its votes in only one of 
the regions. It cannot be defined if regions are not defined or if none of the 
parties receives any votes. While the latter is an impossible condition, the former 
requires some more consideration.
Theoretically, the problem of what constitutes a region is complex. The 
proposed measure does not imply any specific solution, and indeed in the 
extreme version, each citizen can be considered as a ‘region’ voting exclusively 
for one of the parties. In a mathematical exercise of very little practical utility, it 
can be demonstrated that in this case, the value of Reg approximates E(/?,vl-p,). 
For the purposes of real-world research, however, it seems quite appropriate to 
agree with Rose and Urwin in that ‘administrative boundaries are derived from 
politically meaningful judgments, and... the very existence of those boundaries 
will encourage political organizations to conduct activities with some respect for 
regional boundaries’.10 In federations, the definition of regions poses particularly 
little problem. But in nominally unitary states, the largest administrative 
territorial units are also not very difficult to identify. Of course, so defined 
regions vary tremendously in their numbers and degrees of political 




























































































of the proposed index. The degrees of political distinctiveness remain different, 
but this is exactly the kind of differentiation the proposed index cannot be 
adjusted to. In cross-national research, we characterize overtly different entities 
as nation states in our (not always fruitless) attempts to derive useful knowledge 
from comparing them to each other. Cross-regional research cannot avoid 
similar advantages; nor it can be expected to avoid similar limitations.
The Data and Preliminary Findings
Before turning to the case studies of the dynamics of party system 
regionalization in seven countries, we would like to approach the problem from 
a broader comparative perspective. Tables 2 and 3 provide the values of Reg and 
one of the indices of party system fragmentation, the Herfindahl -  Hirschman 
coefficient (HH), 11 calculated for 20 “old” democracies and for the same 
number of “new” democracies, respectively, with each coefficient corresponding 
to one election only. 12 In our selection of “old” democracies, we relied, with a 
couple of omissions, on the list provided by Arend Lijphart.13 Since the mid- 
eighties, several of these countries (most notably, Italy and Japan) have 
experienced profound party system change. For the purposes of this study, 
however, it is important to observe the well-established party systems in their 
stability, not in flux. That is why we chose to focus our inquiry on the elections 
held in 1982-1986 rather than on the most recent ones. In our selection of “new” 
democracies, we attempted to present the widest geographical and chronological 
range of cases fitting into the category of ‘transitions to democracy’. While the 
scope of the inquiry had been deliberately limited to elections held after 1945, in 
practical terms, the major limitation stemmed from low data availability. It was 
primarily for this reason that we failed to include any of the African or Asian 
cases of regime change. Hence no claim can be made that the sample is 




























































































Table 2. Party system concentration (HH) and regionalization (Reg) in 
“old” democracies (in the descending order of regionalization)
HH Reg
Switzerland. 1983 0.167 0.565
Belgium, 1985 0.221 0.454
Japan, 1983 0.273 0.405
Iceland, 1983 0.236 0.390
Finland, 1983 0.183 0.376
New Zealand, 1984 0.335 0.372
Norway, 1985 0.288 0.352
Italy, 1983 0.221 0.346
Luxembourg, 1984 0.274 0.344
Canada, 1984 0.364 0.339
United Kingdom, 1983 0.321 0.314
Denmark, 1984 0.191 0.311
Austria, 1983 0.415 0.303
Netherlands, 1982 0.236 0.303
France, 1986 0.295 0.300
Sweden, 1985 0.284 0.290
Ireland, 1982 0.368 0.237
Germany, 1983 0.392 0.251
United States, 1984 0.511 0.232




























































































Table 3. Party system concentration (HH) and regionalization (Reg) in 
“new” democracies (in the descending order of regionalization)
HH Reg
Ecuador, 1984 0.096 0.488
Venezuela, 1963 0.182 0.481
Russia, 1995 0.099 0.452
Slovakia, 1994 0.172 0.428
Croatia, 1995 0.264 0.421
Bolivia, 1993 0.214 0.412
Hungary, 1990 0.149 0.411
Spain, 1979 0.232 0.405
Portugal, 1980 0.346 0.392
Germany, 1953 0.302 0.382
Peru, 1995 0.303 0.368
Italy, 1953 0.240 0.367
Argentina, 1985 0.316 0.343
Bulgaria, 1990 0.363 0.340
Austria, 1953 0.362 0.328
Czech Republic, 1996 0.188 0.293
Uruguay, 1984 0.338 0.281
El Salvador, 1994 0.287 0.277
Greece, 1985 0.387 0.251
Dominican Republic. 1982 0.445 0.243
The comparison of the values of Reg presented in the tables shows that on the 
average, the well-established party systems tend to be less regionalized than the 
inchoate ones. The average values of Reg are 0.334 in ‘old’ democracies and 
0.368 in ‘new’ democracies. Furthermore, the well-established party systems 
tend to be more concentrated than the inchoate ones. The average values of HH 
are 0.304 and 0.264, respectively. However, none of the observed differences is 
statistically significant. Therefore, the data do not allow for inference that party 
systems maturate by becoming both more concentrated and less regionalized. At 
the same time, the linear correlation between Reg and HH is rather strong: -0.72 
for “old” democracies, -0.76 for ‘new’ democracies, and -0.75 for the whole 
selection of cases.14 This means that, in general, party system concentration 
explains more than half (56 per cent) of the variance of Reg.'5 In the following 
analysis, these preliminary findings will be subjected to an in-depth test by 
examining seven cases of party system development in ‘new’ democracies.
The selection of cases for this study followed several formal criteria. First, 
we selected only those countries that, during the periods of observation, 
experienced transitions from authoritarian rule. We did not ascribe to this 




























































































occupation (several West European countries after the Second World War) or 
brief authoritarian interludes (Costa Rica. 1954), transitions from one 
democratic regime to another (France, 1958). and partial democratizations 
(Colombia, 1958). Second, we limited the chronological scope of inquiry by not 
considering transitions to democracy occurring earlier than in 1945. Several 
cases from the ‘second wave of democratization’, however, have been willingly 
included. While it cannot be denied that contextual differences between the 
‘waves of democratization’ are profound, we are inclined to agree with Maurizio 
Cotta in that the heuristic payoffs of such ‘cross-wave’ comparisons overweight 
disadvantages rooted in the highly heterogeneous nature of the data.11’ Third, in 
order to trace the dynamics of party system regionalization over time, we 
included only those countries that experienced uninterrupted democratic 
development for no less than 15 years, with four or more free elections being 
held after the ‘founding’ elections (in this analysis, we used only the data from 
parliamentary or congressional elections).17 These, for the narrow purposes of 
this study, have been considered as analogous to the events of regime change.
The third criterion disqualified several transitions to democracy that 
occurred in West Europe and Latin America after the Second World War, and 
all East European and a considerable number of Latin American and other cases 
from the ‘third wave’ of democratization. This left me with three cases from the 
‘second wave of democratization’ -  Austria, Federal Republic of Germany, and 
Italy; with four cases from the ‘third wave’ -  Bolivia. Greece. Portugal, and 
Spain; and with one case that can be chronologically located somewhere in 
between, Venezuela.18 Cases satisfying the criteria set above but not included 
into the study are few -  Japan, Ecuador, and Peru. In all three cases, the reason 
for their non-inclusion is the lack of reliable data on the early post-authoritarian 
elections. Thus the selection comprises 72,7 per cent of the formally available 
cases. The time limits for each of the case studies were set to minimally satisfy 
the third criterion outlined above. Table 4 gives some factual information about 




























































































Table 4. Factual information about the cases
Time Nr N e Definition of Regions
Austria 1945-62 9 6 Bundeslander
Bolivia 1979-97 9 6 Departments
Germany 1949-53 9 6 Lander
1957-69 10
Greece 1974-93 56 8 Electoral districts
Italy 1946-63 19 5 Regions
Portugal 1975-95 20 9 18 districts and 2 autonomous regions
Spain 1977-96 52 ' l 50 provinces, Ceuta, and Melilla
Venezuela 1958-78 23 5 Federal district, 20 states, and 2 federal territories
Noles: The Portuguese 1976 legislative elections did not take place in the autonomous region 
of Madeira. In our case study of Spain, we chose to employ provinces rather than autonomous 
regions as basic units of analysis simply because regional autonomy was legally established 
throughout the nation only by 1983.
Cases from the ‘second wave’ of democratization
A rather simple model of party system development, displaying continuously 
decreasing levels of both fragmentation and regionalization, emerges from the 
case of West Germany (Tables 5 and 6).19 However, a closer look at the 
regionalization indices of individual parties reveals that the mechanics beyond 
this process were rather complex. The high level of party system regionalization 
observable in the ‘founding’ elections of 1949 can be only partly explained with 
reference to the presence of purely regional parties like the Bavarian Party and 
German Party. More importantly, the largest party of the 1949 elections, the 
Christian Democratic Union / Christian Social Union,20 was rather highly 
regionalized in comparison to its major rival, the Social Democratic Party of 
Germany. Indeed, at the outset of the new German party system the Social 
Democrats were the only truly national party, and it is interesting to note that in 
this respect, the small Communist party rather than the Christian Democrats was 
in the second place. In 1953, this situation started to change. Small parties with 
fairly regional bases of support were still capable of capturing a significant share 
of the vote. But, while the level of regionalization of the Social Democratic 
Party increased, the support base of the Christian Democrats became much more 
nationalized. This trend persisted thereafter, probably facilitated with the 
electoral demise of minor parties that effectively took place in 1957-1961. By 
1965, the indices of regionalization of two major parties became almost equally 




























































































the Christian Democratic Union / Christian Social Union firmly establishing 
itself in this capacity. The third electorally important actor, the Free Democratic 
Party, apparently survived by widening its national appeal rather by 
consolidating its regional bases. The only new organization that attracted some 
noticeable electoral support in the sixties, the extreme right National Democratic 
Party, was much less regionalized than its predecessors in the fifties. In 1965- 
1969, the German party system comprised no regional organizations altogether. 
It achieved the level of regionalization so stable that it remained virtually the 
same twenty years later (Table 2).
Table 5. Party system concentration (HH) and electoral returns of major 
parties (percentage shares of the vote in national legislative elections) in the 
Federal Republic of Germany, 1949-69
1949 1953 1957 1961 1965 1969
HH 0.204 0.302 0.363 0.355 0.391 0.4
CDU/CSU 31.0 45.2 50.2 45.4 47.6 46.1
SPD 29.2 28.8 31.8 36.2 39.3 42.7
FDP 11.9 9.5 7.7 12.8 9.5 5.8
KPD 5.7 2.2 - - - -
BP 4.2 1.7 - - - -
DP 4.0 3.3 3.4 - - -
BHE/GB - 5.9 4.6 2.8 - -
NPD - - - - 2.0 4.3
Legend: CDU/CSU -  Christian Democratic Union / Christian Social Union; SPD -  Social 
Democratic Party of Germany; FDP -  Free Democratic Party of Germany; KPD -  Communist 
Party of Germany; BP -  Bavarian Party; DP -  German Party; BHE/GB -  Bloc of Expellees 
and Refugees / United German Bloc; NPD -  National Democratic Party of Germany.
Table 6. Party system regionalization (Reg) and regionalization indices of 
major parties in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1949-69
1949 1953 1957 1961 1965 1969
Reg 0.459 0.382 0.353 0.298 0.257 0.255
CDU/CSU 0.417 0.337 0.307 0.308 0.254 0.262
SPD 0.269 0.297 0.313 0.273 0.249 0.240
FDP 0.460 0.444 0.452 0.260 0.294 0.296
KPD 0.336 0.427 - - - -
BP 1 . 0 1 . 0 - - - -
DP 0.791 0.687 0.654 - - -
BHE/GB - 0.544 0.582 0.592 - -
NPD - - - - 0.315 0.272




























































































The Austrian party system, with its remarkably stable levels of both 
concentration and regionalization, differs from the case discussed above quite 
sharply (Tables 7 and 8). The major parties in the 1945 ‘founding’ elections, the 
Austrian Peoples’ Party and the Socialist Party of Austria, did become less 
regionalized over time, but by no means to the same extent as it happened with 
the German Christian Democrats. In fact, they were already national parties 
when they entered the electoral arena. Apparently, the major factor responsible 
for the specificity of the Austrian model was the emergence of the Freedom 
Party of Austria (then the League of Independents) in the 1949 elections. The 
new party was not only rather highly regionalized itself. Probably of more 
importance, its appearance facilitated the increased regionalization of another 
non-clerical party, the Socialists, in 1949, and of another right-wing party, the 
Peoples’ Party, in 1953. By 1956, however, both major parties managed to 
reverse these trends towards their increased regionalization, and they expanded 
their national appeal beyond the limits set in 1945. At the same time, two minor 
organizations, the Freedom Party and the Communists, retained their initial 
levels of regionalization. By 1959, the Austrian party system assumed a specific 
structure that could be called ‘congruent’ in sense that there were two large 
‘nationalized’ parties, representing the country’s major political and ideological 
alternatives, and two small ‘regionalized’ parties representing alternative forms 
of political radicalism. Just as it happened in Germany, this structure proved to 
be remarkably stable over time. The electoral demise of the Communist party 
did not bring about any change in party system regionalization.
Table 7. Party system concentration (HH) and electoral returns of major 
parties (percentage shares of the vote in national legislative elections) in 
Austria, 1945-62
1945 1949 1953 1956 1959 1962
HH 0.452 0.360 0.362 0.403 0.403 0.406
OVP 49.9 44.0 41.3 46.0 44.2 45.4
SPÓ 44.7 38.7 42.1 43.0 44.8 44.0
KPÒ 5.4 5.1 5.3 4.4 3.3 3.0
FPO - 11.7 11.0 6.5 7.7 7.0
Legend: ÓVP -  Austrian People’s Party; SPÓ -  Socialist Party of Austria; KPÓ -  Communist 
Party of Austria, normally in coalition with the left-wing socialists” (Austrian People’s 



























































































Table 8. Party system regionalization (fieg) and regionalization indices of 
major parties in Austria, 1945-62
1945 1949 1953 1956 1959 1962
Reg 0.311 0.342 0.328 0.314 0.299 0.303
ÔVP 0.298 0.293 0.308 0.287 0.281 0.277
SPÔ 0.306 0.338 0.309 0.295 0.279 0.287
KPÔ 0.480 0.445 0.435 0.495 0.486 0.510
FPÔ - 0.492 0.429 0.502 0.438 0.479
Legend and source: as for Table 7.
The most salient peculiarity of the case of Italy is that in the second free 
elections, both fragmentation and regionalization of the country’s party system 
sharply decreased. Before long, however, high fragmentation made its new and 
persistent appearance, while regionalization remained stable thereafter (Tables 9 
and 10). On the level of individual parties, the initial picture was not 
qualitatively different from that observed in the German ‘founding’ elections. 
There was only one national party, the Christian Democrats. What makes the 
case of Italy so different is the continuous lack of single, albeit regionalized, 
political alternative to the only party of national appeal. True, in the elections of 
1948 the Italian party system approximated the German situation of 1949 quite 
closely. But as the short-living coalition of the Italian Communist Party and left- 
wing Socialists collapsed, both parties (although the latter more than the former) 
retained their regional profdes. Moreover, by 1963 the Communist party became 
more regionalized than it was in 1953. Trends towards nationalization were 
more apparent in the development of the second largest left-wing party, and 
indeed, in 1963 only the Socialists could claim the role of the national 
alternative to the Christian Democrats for themselves. This claim, however, 
would not have been sustained by the party’s modest electoral performance. 
While the internal structure of the conservative ideological bloc remained almost 
perfectly congruent throughout the formative phase of party system 
development in Italy (with the neo-fascist Italian Social Movement representing 
a continuously deviant case), the left-wing bloc became increasingly 
incongruent over time. On the systemic level, a remarkably stable level of 
regionalization echoed this peculiarity. From Table 2, it can be inferred that in 





























































































Table 9. Party system concentration (HH) and electoral returns of major 
parties (percentage shares of the vote in national legislative elections) in 
Italy, 1946-63
1946 1948 1953 1958 1963
HH 0.213 0.340 0.240 0.259 0.241
DC 35.2 48.5 40.1 42.3 38.3
FDP - 31.2 - - -
PCI 18.9 - 22.6 22.7 25.3
Socialists 20.7 - 12.8 14.2 13.8
Social Democrats - 7.1 4.5 4.6 6.1
Liberals 6.8 3.8 3.0 3.5 7.0
Monarchists 2.8 2.8 6.9 4.9 1.7
MSI - 2.0 5.8 4.8 5.1
Legend. DC -  Christian Democratic Party; FDP -  Popular Democratic Front (a coalition of 
Communists and Socialists); PCI -  Italian Communist Party; Socialists -  Italian Socialist 
Party of Proletarian Unity in 1946, Italian Socialist Party thereafter; Social Democrats -  
Socialist Unity in 1948, Italian Social Democratic Party thereafter; Liberals -  National 
Democratic Union in 1946, National Bloc in 1948, Italian Liberal Party thereafter; 
Monarchists -  National Bloc for Liberty in 1946, National Monarchist Party and National 
Democratic Alliance of Labor in 1948, National Monarchist Party in 1953, National 
Monarchist Party and Popular Monarchist Party in 1958, Italian Democratic Party of 
Monarchist Unity in 1963; MSI -  Italian Social Movement.
Table 10. Party system regionalization (Reg) and regionalization indices of 
major parties in Italy, 1946-63
1946 1948 1953 1958 1963
__________ 0.445 0.358 0.367 0.342 0.342
DC 0.314 0.230 0.252 0.231 0.262
FDP - 0.422 - - -
PCI 0.494 - 0.373 0.388 0.393
Socialists 0.482 - 0.443 0.376 0.324
Social Democrats - 0.490 0.492 0.505 0.394
Liberals 0.626 0.652 0.469 0.421 0.432
Monarchists 0.771 0.738 0.628 0.612 0.589
MSI - 0.574 0.438 0.442 0.421




























































































This brief analysis of three ‘old new democracies’ indicates that party system 
regionalization is a parameter that changes unevenly over time and across 
nations. In all three countries, the most dramatic changes occurred in the second 
free elections. But in Italy, it was also the last instance of change: in Austria, a 
stable pattern of party system regionalization was established only in the third 
elections; and in Germany, in the fifth ones. It can be noted, however, that in the 
time span of no more than fifteen years, all three party systems achieved certain 
levels of regionalization that did not change thereafter. It appears that at some 
moment, each party system achieves a level of regionalization that is ‘natural’ 
for it and can be sustained until substantial voter realignment arrives. In this 
study, we will not subject this preliminary finding to any theoretical 
interpretation. What is important to emphasize for our immediate purposes is 
that as far as party system regionalization is concerned, timing does matter. 
Patterns observable at the outset of party system formation may pass away 
before long, but this is not the case with the levels of regionalization stemming 
from later developments. They are likely to persist. Given that the further 
analysis will be focused on ‘new new democracies’, for which no retrospective 
judgments are feasible, this hypothesis seems to be comfortable even if not fully 
substantiated.
Perhaps more importantly, one can expect that rather then being unique, 
developmental trends observed in ‘old new democracies’ can make their 
appearance in more recent instances of party system formation. But, as we have 
seen, the cases from the ‘second wave of democratization’ are very different 
from each other. The linear pattern of continuously decreasing regionalization in 
Germany contrasts quite sharply to the curvilinear developmental pattern of 
Austria and to Italy with its persistent regional bases of party politics. What path 
of party system development prevails in the ‘third wave’ democracies?
Cases from the ‘Third W ave’ of Democratization
In certain respects, the chronologically intermediate case -  that of Venezuela -  
carries important similarities both to Germany and Austria. Similarly to what we 
have observed in Austria, the Venezuelan party system became both more 
fragmented and more regionalized in the second free elections. And similarly to 
Germany, it experienced sharp declines of both parameters thereafter, eventually 
to become one of the least regionalized party systems in the world (Tables 11 
and 12). In the ‘founding’ elections of 1958, only one party, the center-left 
Democratic Action, emerged as a truly national organization. Its major rivals, 
the ideologically similar but politically antagonistic Democratic Republican 
Union and the Christian Democratic COPEI (Committee of Independent 




























































































dramatic rise of system-level regionalization in the 1963 elections can be 
explained with reference to the constellation of three interdependent factors. 
Those were the electoral defeat of the Democratic Action; the successful 
performance of COPEI which, while widening its electoral appeal, remained a 
fairly regionalized party; and the arrival of the new competitors, the right-wing 
Independents for the National Front and the left-leaning Democratic Popular 
Force, both of which had regional support bases. All these developments took 
place against the backgrounds of the electoral defeat of the Democratic 
Republican Union. In 1968, with COPEI establishing itself as the major 
opposition party nationwide, system-level regionalization started to decrease. 
But major change took place in 1973, when the Democratic Action regained 
much of its support lost in the sixties, COPEI consolidated its positions, and the 
share of the vote captured by small parties, including the Democratic Republican 
Union, fell to about 25 per cent. The shape of the Venezuelan party system 
observed in the 1978 elections was almost perfectly congruent. Within each of 
the ideological blocs, there was one national party and an array of very small 
heavily regionalized parties. Among the cases discussed so far, COPEI is unique 
in that over time, its electoral success invariably coincided with the decreased 
levels of regionalization. Hence it can be considered as the very model of 
national party formation.
Table 11. Party system concentration (HH) and electoral returns of major 
parties (percentage shares of the vote in national legislative elections) in 
Venezuela, 1958-78
1958 1963 1968 1973 1978
HH 0.317 0.183 0.166 0.298 0.302
AD 47.5 30.6 25.6 44.4 38.5
COPEI 14.6 19.5 24.2 30.2 38.6
URD 25.7 16.3 9.3 3.2 1.6
PCV 6.0 - - - -
IPFN - 12.5 2.6 - -
FDP - 9.0 5.3 1.2 0.3
CCN - - 11.0 4.3 0.2
MEP - - 13.0 5.0 2.2
MAS - - - 5.3 6.0
Legend: AD -  Democratic Action; COPEI -  Committee of Independent Electoral Political 
Organization; URD -  Democratic Republican Union; PCV -  Communist Party of Venezuela; 
IPFN -  Independents for the National Front (National Democratic Front in 1968); FDP -  
Democratic Popular Force; CCN -  Civic Nationalist Crusade; MEP -  Electoral Movement of 




























































































Tabic 12. Party system regionalization (Reg) and regionalization indices of 
major parties in Venezuela, 1958-78
1958 1963 1968 1973 1978
Reg 0.436 0.481 0.446 0.341 0.282
AD 0.355 0.362 0.317 0.265 0 258
COPEI 0.573 0.495 0.446 0.312 0.247
URD 0.482 0.477 0.478 0.644 0.684
PCV 0.545 - - - -
IPFN - 0.597 0.361 - -
FDP - 0.698 0.531 0.445 0.510
CCN - - 0.631 0.556 0.435
MEP - - 0.476 0.581 0.533
MAS - - - 0.502 0.407
Legend: as for Table 11.
The Portuguese party system also became less fragmented and less regionalized 
in the course of its development (Tables 13 and 14). Like in the cases of 
Germany and Venezuela, the underlying mechanics can be described in terms of 
gradual development of the second national party. In the ‘founding’ elections of 
1975, only the Socialists acted in this capacity. Both right-wing organizations, 
the Social Democratic Party (then the Popular Democratic Party) and the 
Democratic Social Center, were highly regionalized, and even as a coalition 
receiving the largest shares of the vote in the 1979 and 1980 elections, they 
could not match the level of nationalization attained by PS. After the coalition 
collapsed, the Democratic Social Center remained a regionalized party. The 
developmental path of the Social Democratic Party, however, was very similar 
to that of the Venezuelan Christian Democrats. Starting with 1983, the Social 
Democrats continuously increased their share of the vote, while the party’s level 
of regionalization fell quite significantly. It was only by 1996 that the 
Portuguese party system finally became congruent in the sense that its largest 
party became its least regionalized party. But, in contrast to 1975, the distance 
between the regionalization levels of the leading parties was not very large. The 
case of Portugal displays two peculiarities that are worth mentioning in this 
discussion. One of them is the meteoric appearance of the Party of Democratic 
Renewal, the ‘presidential’ party that captured 18.5 per cent of the vote in 1985 
to fade away in the subsequent elections. In contrast to the Bloc of Expellees 
and Refugees in Germany, the Freedom Party in Austria, and an array of ‘new 
entrants’ observed in Venezuela, the Party of Democratic Renewal was 
relatively evenly supported across the nation at the time when it emerged. This, 




























































































speculate that the lack of regional support bases actually contributed to its fast 
collapse. The second peculiarity is that in 1975-1985, the level of 
regionalization of the second-largest left-wing party, the Communists, did not 
correspond to the relatively large size of its electorate. Such a combination, not 
observed in the previously discussed cases, is therefore practically possible, 
even though the case of the Portuguese Communist Party also indicates that in 
the long run, it may be difficult to sustain it.
Table 13. Party system concentration (HH) and electoral returns of major 
parties (percentage shares of the vote in national legislative elections) in 
Portugal, 1975-91
1975 1976 1979 1980 1983 1985 1987 1991 1995
HH 0.273 0.250 0.333 0.346 0.253 0.200 0.320 0.351 0.329
PS 40.7 36.7 28.2 28.7 36.1 20.8 22.2 29.1 44.2
AD - - 46.3 48.3 - - - - -
PSD 28.3 25.2 - - 27.2 30.0 50.2 50.6 34.3
CDS 8.2 16.7 - - 12.6 10.0 4.4 4.4 9.2
MDP 4.4 - - - - - - - -
PCP 13.5 15.3 19.5 17.4 18.1 15.5 12.1 8.8 8.7
PRD - - - - - 17.9 4.9 - -
Legend: PS -  Socialist Party (Republican and Socialist Front in 1980); AD -  Democratic 
Alliance (a coalition of PSD, CDS, and Monarchists; includes votes separately cast for PSD 
and CDS in Azores and Madeira); PSD -  Social Democratic Party (Popular Democratic Party 
in 1975-79); CDS -  Democratic Social Center (CDS-Popular Party in 1995); MDP -  
Portuguese Democratic Movement; PCP -  Portuguese Communist Parly (United People’s 
Alliance in 1979-85, Union of the Democratic Coalition in 1987-91, PCP and the Greens in 
1995); PRD -  Party of Democratic Renewal.
Table 14. Party system regionalization (Reg) and regionalization indices of 
major parties in Portugal, 1975-96
1975 1976 1979 1980 1983 1985 1987 1991 1995
ReS 0.464 0.426 0.394 0.392 0.398 0.391 0.354 0.313 0.320
PS 0.351 0.295 0.287 0.305 0.271 0.263 0.263 0.243 0.226
AD - - 0.366 0.363 - - - - -
PSD 0.501 0.438 - - 0.393 0.362 0.311 0.287 0.352
CDS 0.549 0.471 - - 0.459 0.476 0.410 0.404 0.341
MDP 0.419 - - - - - - - -
PCP 0.675 0.663 0.605 0.611 0.616 0.596 0.630 0.649 0.648
PRD - - - - - 0.367 0.483 - -




























































































In Spain (Tables 15 and 16), trends facilitating party system regionalization 
were strong and persistent. Like in Venezuela, one of the leading parties failed 
to survive the pressures of the formative phase of party system development. 
The difference is that in Spain, no party was quick to assume national 
prominence. In the 1977 ‘founding’ elections, there were two parties of national 
appeal, the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party and the Union of Democratic 
Center (UCD), and two more or less regionalized organizations representing 
alternative forms of political radicalism, the Spanish Communist Party and the 
Popular Alliance. In addition, the Spanish party system contained a plethora of 
purely regional parties, the largest of them being the conservative Convergence 
and Union in Catalonia. This situation changed dramatically when in 1982, the 
organizational and electoral collapse of the Union of Democratic Center pushed 
the Popular Alliance into the position of the largest right-wing party. But, with 
its 26.5 per cent of the vote, it was far from being the legitimate heir of all the 
votes once cast for the Union of Democratic center. And, although its level of 
regionalization decreased quite drastically, it remained larger than that of the 
Socialists. In 1989, the Popular Party and the most viable rump of UCD, the 
Democratic and Social Center, were still almost equally regionalized. It was 
only in the nineties that the Popular Party finally squeezed out the ‘centrists’ and 
finally managed to become not only the largest, but also the truly national party 
of the right. But it still remains much more of a regional party than the 
Socialists. In fact, the decreased regionalization of the Socialist Party in the 
1993 and 1996 elections can be viewed as the most important factor of system- 
level dynamics. The Communist-led coalition continues to enjoy fairly large 
electoral support while retaining its regional profile. This, combined with the 
uninterrupted presence of regional parties, contributes to the persistence of a 




























































































Table 15. Party system concentration (HH) and electoral returns of major 
parties (percentage shares of the vote in national legislative elections) in 
Spain, 1977-96
1977 1979 1982 1986 1989 1993 1996
HH 0.221 0.232 0.312 0.278 0.240 0.284 0.306
PSOE 29.2 30.5 48.3 44.3 39.9 39.1 37.5
UCD 34.5 35.0 6.5 - - - -
CDS - - 2.9 9.2 8.0 1.8 -
PP 8.1 6.0 26.5 26.1 25.1 34.6 38.9
PCE 9.4 10.7 4.0 4.5 9.1 9.3 10.6
CiU 2.8 2.7 3.7 5.1 5.1 5.0 4.6
Legend: PSOE -  Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (including votes cast for the Party of 
Socialists of Catalonia); UCD -  Union of the Democratic Center; CDS -  Democratic and 
Social Center; PP -  Popular Party (Popular Alliance in 1977 and 1982, Democratic Coalition 
in 1979, Popular Coalition in 1986); PCE -  Spanish Communist Party (United Left in 1986- 
96; including votes cast for the Unified Socialist party of Catalonia in 1977-82, the Union of 
• Catalon Left in 1986, and the Initiative for Catalonia in 1989-96); CiU -  Convergence and 
lj Union (Democratic Pact for Catalonia in 1977).
*' Table 16. Party system regionalization (Reg) and regionalization indices of 
major parties in Spain, 1977-89
1977 1979 1982 1986 1989 1993 1996
Reg 0.416 0.405 0.394 0.400 0.413 0.380 0.361
PSOE 0.342 0.328 0.309 0.301 0.303 0.286 0.269
UCD 0.378 0.346 0.503 - - - ; -
CDS - - 0.506 0.444 0.419 0.513 -
PP 0.423 0.493 0.346 0.366 0.404 0.347 0.331
PCE 0.510 0.497 0.531 0.511 0.464 0.419 0.415
CiU 0.970 0.970 0.970 0.970 0.970 0.970 0.970
Legend: as for Table 15.
The case of Greece (Tables 17 and 18), with its initially moderate and 
.i continuously decreasing levels of regionalization, reminds of both Austria and 
Germany in these particular respects. And, like in Venezuela, the failure of one 
of the largest parties to sustain its national appeal resulted in an immediate 
increase in regionalization. In Greece, this was caused by the replacement of the 
second largest party, the Union of the Democratic Center, with the center-left 
Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement both in terms of its overall electoral support 
and national appeal. The 1981 elections largely completed this process. An 





























































































Socialists fully took its shape, leaving the relatively small Communist party on 
the margins. This trend progressed in the following elections. It was the 
corruption scandal of the late eighties that undermined the national appeal of the 
Socialists. In the 1990 elections, system-level regionalization increased 
correspondingly. What is important is that at this moment, no strong newcomers 
entered the electoral arena. In the end, the Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement 
managed to survive the challenge. When the populist Political Spring tried to 
exploit the anti-corruption theme in order to establish itself as an electoral force, 
it was already too late, for by 1993, the Socialists fully recovered to reassume 
their role of the leading national party. Similarly to what we observed in 
Portugal, the Greek communist movement remained highly regionalized 
throughout the period of democratization, but it was too weak in electoral terms 
to alter the unusually low level of party system regionalization achieved by the 
country.
Table 17. Party system concentration (HH) and electoral returns of major 
parties (percentage shares of the vote in national legislative elections) in 
Greece, 1974-93
1974 1977 1981 1985 1989(1) 1989(2) 1990 1993
HH 0.365 0.268 0.372 0.387 0.367 0.391 0.380 0.380
ND 54.4 41.8 35.9 40.8 44.3 46.2 46.9 39.3
PASOK 13.6 25.3 48.1 45.8 39.1 40.7 38.6 46.9
KKE - 9.4 9.4 9.9 - - - 4.5
KKE-es - 2.7 1.3 1.8 - - - 2.9
Left 9.5 - - - 13.1 11.0 10.3 -
EDIK 20.4 12.0 - - - - - -
EP - 6.8 - - - - - -
POLA - - - - - - - 4.9
Note: Elections 1989 (1) and 1989 (2) took place in June and November 1989, respectively. 
Legend: ND -  New Democracy; PASOK -  Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement; KKE -  
Communist Party of Greece; KKE-es -  Communist Party of Greece (“Interior”) and related 
formations (Alliance of Progressive and Left-wing Forces in 1977, Progressive Left Coalition 
in 1993); Left -  coalitions that included both communist parties (United Left in 1974, 
Progressive Left Coalition in 1989-1990); EDIK -  Union of the Democratic Center (Center 




























































































Table 18. Party system regionalization (Reg) and regionalization indices of 
major parties in Greece, 1974-93
1974 1977 1981 1985 1989(1) 1989(2) 1990 1993
0.325 0338 0.268 0.251 0.245 0.249 0.292 0.241
ND 0.269 0.267 0.270 0.241 0.225 0.219 0.224 0.230
PASOK 0.375 0.287 0.217 0.215 0.214 0.236 0.333 0.204
KKE - 0.490 0.448 0.434 - - - 0.473
KKE-es - 0.508 0.584 0.413 - - - 0.402
Left 0.547 - - - 0.408 0.417 0.451 -
EDIK 0.338 0.437 - - - - - -
EP - 0.515 - - - - - -
POLA - - - - - - - 0.366
Legend: as for Table 17.
The development of party system in Bolivia (Tables 19 and 20) displays a 
unique pattern. Not only the initial level of party system regionalization in the 
country was very high, but it also increased over time. This can be explained 
with reference to the fact that none of those parties which, at this or that 
moment, managed to widen their national appeal, succeeded in sustaining it. The 
initial “two-party system” consisting of the Nationalist Revolutionary 
Movement and the left-wing coalition, Democratic and Popular Unity, 
collapsed, as the Nationalist Democratic Action became electorally stronger, 
while the left-wing coalition fell apart to be only partly replaced with the 
Movement of the Revolutionary Left. In the 1993 elections, however, the short­
lived coalition of Nationalist Democratic Action and the Movement of the 
Revolutionary Left failed as well. Finally, the defeat of the Nationalist 
Revolutionary Movement in the 1997 elections epitomized the failure to develop 
a political party of national appeal. Every single claimant for this role survived, 
but none fulfilled this promise. Against these backgrounds, the rise of populist 
anti-corruption parties (the Conscience of the Fatherland and the Civic 
Solidarity Union) resulted in the increased level of party system regionalization. 
In contrast to Greece, where the Political Spring entered the electoral 
competition only to discover that the traditional parties were too strong to be 
squeezed out, the Bolivian populists succeeded in their undertaking. In general, 
Bolivia represents a dramatic exaggeration of all trends facilitating high levels 
of party system regionalization, when the lack of sustainable parties of national 
appeal adds to a plethora of successful new entrants into the electoral arena, and 
to the persistent presence of minor regional parties. Such trends were observable 
in nearly all the cases discussed above. But Austria, Italy, and other counties 




























































































case of Bolivia is that insofar a party system fails to become consolidated, high 
levels of regionalization in party support are likely to be sustained.
None of the ‘third wave’ democracies presents a picture of continuously 
decreasing regionalization. In Venezuela and Greece, the rise of nationally based 
parties reduced party system regionalization to very low levels only after second 
free elections. In Portugal and Spain, the national bases of party politics 
emerged more steadily but also much more slowly and indecisively. Thus in a 
wide comparative perspective, the case of Germany turns out to be no less 
unique than that of Bolivia. As it often happens in social research, the empirical 
data suggest neither linearity nor chaos as dominant trends. Reality lies 
somewhere in between.
Table 19. Party system concentration (HH) and electoral returns of major 
parties (percentage shares of the vote in national legislative elections) in 
Bolivia, 1979-97
1979 1980 1985 1989 1993 1997
HH 0.285 0.230 0.218 0.200 0.214 0.169
MNR 35.9 20.1 30.4 25.6 35.6 18.2
ADN 14.9 16.8 32.8 25.2 - 22.3
AP - - - - 21.0 -
MIR - - 10.2 21.8 - 16.8
MBL - - - - 5.4 3.1
UDP 36.0 38.7 - - - -
MNRI - - 5.5 - - -
VR-9 - - 4.8 - - -
IU - - - 8.0 1.0 3.7
PS-1 4.8 8.7 2.6 2.8 - -
APIN 4.1 - - - - -
CONDEPA - -  • - 12.3 14.3 17.2
UCS - - - - 13.8 16.1
Note: In 1997, shares of the vote cast for party lists.
Legend: MNR -  Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR-Alliance in 1980, in coalition 
with Tupac Katari Revolutionary Liberation Movement in 1993); ADN -  Nationalist 
Democratic Action; AP -  Patriotic Accord (a coalition of ADN and MIR); MIR -  Movement 
of the Revolutionary Left; MBL -  Movement for a Free Bolivia; UDP -  Democratic and 
Popular Unity (included MNR1, MIR, Communist party, and minor left-wing groups); MNRI 
-  Nationalist Revolutionary Movement of the Left; VR-9 -  Revolutionary Vanguard-April 9; 
IU -  United Left (the Communist party and minor left-wing groups; in 1989 also included 
MBL); PS-1 -  Socialist Party-1; APIN -  Popular Alliance for National Integration; 




























































































Table 20. Party system regionalization (ffeg) and regionalization indices or 
major parties in Bolivia, 1979-97
1979 1980 1985 1989 1993 1997
fog 0.456 0.468 0.401 0.430 0.406 0.465
MNR 0.396 0.509 0.371 0.362 0.265 0.395
ADN 0.439 0.375 0.335 0.342 - 0.379
AP - - - 0.403 -
MIR - - 0485 0.327 - 0.425
MBL - - - - 0.546 0.561
UDP 0.472 0.454 - - - -
MNRI - - 0.445 - - -
VR-9 - - 0.616 - - -
IU - - - 0.533 0.519 0.763
PS-1 0.678 0.571 0.526 0.502 - -
APIN 0.569 - - - - -
CONDEPA - - - 0.825 0.714 0.693
UCS - - - - 0.379 0.373
Legend: as for Table 19.
Conclusion
Is party system regionalization associated with party system concentration? Do 
party systems become less regionalized as they consolidate? When answering 
these questions from a statistical perspective, treating each of the fifty-two 
national elections discussed above as a separate party system configuration 
would not be appropriate unless we took into account the time variable. 
Otherwise, the correlation between HH and Reg might get inflated due to the 
autocorrelation effect. We coded each of the elections according to its temporal 
distance from the event of transition to democracy, so that the ‘founding’ 
elections received the value of zero, elections that took place five years after -  
the value of five, etc. The resulting variable T proved to be associated with Reg. 
Even though the association is not very strong (linear correlation coefficient -  
0.56; 32 per cent of the variance explained), it is still statistically significant.21 
The multiple regression equation Reg = .595 -  .651 HH -  .00405T explains 
about 80 per cent of the variance of the dependent variable, all coefficients being 
highly significant. A still better equation is the one that takes into account the 
interaction effect between HH and T, Reg = .559 -  .531 HH -  .013(HH*T). But 
then the coefficient of the T variable itself becomes insignificant. These 
statistical tests demonstrate that high levels of HH are associated with low levels 




























































































The reason for the strong linear association between Reg and HH becomes 
quite obvious upon an examination of the relationship between individual 
parties’ sizes and their regionalization indices." Small parties are more likely to 
be regionalized. Linear measures of association between party size and its 
regionalization index would not be appropriate here because of heteroscedastic 
variance. In particular, the variance of R' depends on the level of p. where R ' is 
the individual party regionalization index and p is the party's share of the vote. 
Small values of p are associated with high variance of R ’. Whereas all large 
parties have very small values of /?’, the regionalization index of small parties 
varies from very small to very large values. Intuitively, this makes sense, as one 
would expect a party winning the national vote to have a strong support across 
all or most regions. This need not be the case for small parties. A simple 
independent samples T-test confirms the difference of average R ’ for large and 
small parties, whereas the Levene’s test for equality of variances shows a highly 
significant difference of variances for the two groups.
From the case studies, it can be inferred that four important within-system 
factors influence the scope and dynamics of party system regionalization. The 
first of them is the presence or lack of national parties in the ‘founding’ 
elections. True, at least one such party could be registered in each of the cases. 
But what appears to be especially important is whether each of the ideological 
blocs contains a party of national appeal. In Austria, where this was exactly the 
case, party system regionalizaton remained relatively steady over time. In West 
Germany, Venezuela, and Portugal, the initial absence of national right-wing 
parties contributed to quite turbulent patterns of development, although in the 
final account, all these party systems achieved lower levels of regionalization. In 
Greece, it was a left-leaning party, the Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement, which 
widened its appeal to form one of the cornerstones of the national party system. 
The case of Italy, where the regionalization of the largest left-wing party 
remained high at the point of system-level stabilization, appears to be 
exceptional in this respect; Bolivia displays something of a similar pattern, 
though.
The second factor is the sustainability of national parties. Very much like 
the Austrian party system, those of Bolivia and Spain initially contained national 
parties representing major political alternatives. In both cases, however, 
subsequent developments brought about voter realignments resulting in the 
electoral demise and/or increased regionalization of at least one of the original 
national parties. From the evidence presented above, it can be inferred that the 
resulting path of development is conducive to high regionalization on the 
systemic level. The third factor is the continuous presence or lack of small 
national parties deriving their support from a limited number of regions. 




























































































right-wing parties of Italy, played some role in maintaining high levels of party 
system regionalization. Finally, the cases of Austria, Bolivia and Venezuela 
suggest that new entrants into the political arenas can influence the processes 
occurring on the systemic level quite substantially.
Obviously, the factors identified above do not exist in isolation from each 
other. It is their interaction that, in the final account, determines the pace and 
direction of system-level processes. In this study, we will not suggest any 
interpretation of how they interact, although admittedly, such an interpretation 
can be essential for the further research on party system regionalization. Our 
study demonstrates that in every inchoate party system, we can expect to find 
strong factors facilitating the increased nationalization of political competition. 
Apparently, these factors work together (or coincide) with trends counteracting 
party system fragmentation. However, factors impeding this process also exist, 
and sometimes they prevail, which is also testified by the statistical results 
reported above. At the same time, both quantitative and qualitative parts of our 
analysis agree in that relatively mature democracies with high party system 
concentration are more likely to have low levels of political regionalization than 
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several important studies (see, for instance, Rein Taagepera and Matthew Shugart, Seats and 
Votes: The Effects and Determinants o f Electoral Systems (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1989)). In fact, there are many situations when HH, the ‘effective number of parties’, 
and such simple transforms of the Herfindahl-Hirschman coefficient as the Rae index of 
fractionalization (1—HH) can be used interchangeably. They contain exactly the same 
amounts of information. The ‘effective number of parties’ has an advantage of being an 
intuitively appealing way of expressing any given distribution of votes in terms of the number 
of equal size components to which it is equivalent. At the same time, it tends to yield very 
numerically large values if applied to fragmented systems, thus creating oultliers that are less 
than desirable in correlation analysis. In this study, several correlation coefficients will be 
reported. For this reason, HH with its values running from zero to one is a more suitable 
measure.
12. See Appendix for the sources of the data presented in Tables 2 -  20. In all calculations 
reported in Tables 2 and 3 except for the case of the United States, we used the results of 
national legislative elections. For Belgium, the Dutch- and French-speaking Socialists, 
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13. Arend Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majorilarian and Consensus Government in 
Twenty-One Countries (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984).
14. Unless otherwise stated, all correlations reported in this study are significant at 0.01 or
less.
15. One can logically expect that strong party system regionalization is associated with 




























































































between a dummy variable representing federalism (0 -  unitary, 1 -  federal) and Reg for the 
available poll of 40 cases. With the coefficient as low as 0.01 (insignificant), there appears to 
be no association whatsoever, although the sample is obviously not very representative.
16. Maurizio Cotta, “Structuring the New Party Systems after the Dictatorship: Coalitions, 
Alliances, Fusions and Splits during the Transition and Post-Transition Stages", in Geoffrey 
Pridham and Paul G. Lewis, eds., Stabilizing Fragile Democracies: Comparing New Parry 
Systems in Southern and Eastern Europe (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 69-99
17. For a useful conceptualization of the ‘founding’ elections, see Vemon Bogdanor, 
“Founding Elections and Regime Change”, Electoral Studies, 9 (December 1990), 288-294.
18. This study is focused on a very narrow aspect of party system formation. For informative 
in-depth analyses of the formative phases of post-authoritarian party system development in 
Austria, Bolivia, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Venezuela, see Anton Pelinka 
and Fritz Plasser, eds., The Austrian Party System (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989); Eduardo 
A. Gamarra and James M. Malloy, “The Patrimonial Dynamics of Party Politics in Bolivia”, 
in Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully, eds.. Building Democratic Institutions: Party 
Systems in Latin America (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995, 99. 399-433); Tony 
Burkett, Parties and Elections in West Germany: The Search for Stability (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1975); R. Clogg, Parties and Elections in Greece: The Search for Legitimacy 
(London: C. Hurst & Co., 1987); Paolo Fameti, The Italian Party System: 1945-1980 
(London: Frances Pinter, 1985); Thomas C. Bruneau and Alex Macleod, Politics in 
Contemporary Portugal: Parties and the Consolidation of Democracy (Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner, 1986); Ramon E. Arango, Spain: Democracy Regained, 2nd ed. (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1995); and Michael Coppedge, Strong Parties and Lame Ducks: Presidential 
Patryarchy and Factionalism in Venezuela (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 
respectively,
19. The values of Reg given in the tables below are not derivable from the indices of 
regionalization attributed to individual parties because, due to space limitations, we do not 
report information on the following minor parties (normally receiving less than two per cent 
of the national vote): in Germany, Center Party, Federal Union, Economic Reconstruction 
Union, and German Rights Party / German Empire Party; in Italy, Italian Republican Party; in 
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21. It is interesting to note that the coefficient of linear correlation between T and HH is much 
lower, 0.23 (insignificant), although it fits into the theoretically predictable pattern.
22. The following findings are based on the data taken from Table 5 through Table 20. Parties 





























































































Table 2. Dick Leonard and Richard Natkiel, World Allas o f Elections: Voting Patterns in 39 
Democracies (London: Economist, 1986).
Table 3. Dominican Republic and Ecuador -  as for Table 1: Austria. Bolivia, Germany. 
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Corte Nacional Electoral, Internet source, http://ns.bolivian.com /cne/hal-r.hlml 1998.
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